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Abstract—Vehicles are currently being developed and sold with
increasing levels of connectivity and automation. As with all
networked computing devices, increased connectivity often results
in a heightened risk of a cyber security attack. Furthermore,
increased automation exacerbates any risk by increasing the
opportunities for the adversary to implement a successful attack.
In this paper, a large volume of publicly accessible literature
is reviewed and compartmentalised based on the vulnerabilities
identified and mitigation techniques developed. This review high-
lighted that the majority of research is reactive and vulnerabilities
are often discovered by friendly adversaries (white-hat hackers).
Many gaps in the knowledge base were identified. Priority should
be given to address these knowledge gaps to minimise future
cyber security risks in the connected and autonomous vehicle
sector.
I. INTRODUCTION
Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) incorporate
many different technologies to enable driver-less, safe, and
efficient transportation. Connection mechanisms support com-
munication between vehicles and infrastructure, sharing of
data such as position, and speed of movement, etc [1]. Each of
these connectivity functions supports subsequent automation,
which transforms the driver’s role from actor to monitor
by reassigning functions previously performed by humans to
technology. Automation is achieved using sensor technology
to survey the environment, along with some predetermined
knowledge, to plan vehicle activity [2].
The development and commercial release of Connected and
Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) is largely driven by the desire to
produce quicker, more reliable and safer vehicles and and more
robust and resilient transportation infrastructure. Developing
increasingly autonomous and connected vehicles inevitably
requires an increase in computing resources. However, as with
all connected computing infrastructures, increasing the level
of computational functionality and connectivity increases the
exposure of potential vulnerabilities, which can increase the
likelihood of future attacks.
Considerable research effort is being invested in identifying
vulnerabilities, recommending potential mitigation techniques,
as well as highlighting the potential impacts of a vehicle
and related infrastructure becoming compromised [3], [4],
[5], [6], [7]. The extant research has identified vulnerabilities
associated with different sensors, controls, and connection
mechanisms and detailed vulnerabilities in technology that is
currently “on the market”, as well as in proposed technology.
Although there is an abundance of detailed and focused
technical research, there is an absence of research utilising
literature available in the public domain to suggest signifi-
cant gaps and challenges facing the CAV sector. This paper
identified that vulnerabilities are typically being identified and
mitigated in a reactive manner and there are many sizeable
challenges facing the CAV research community, including
manufacturers. The aim of the present research was to review
the research on CAV related cyber security vulnerabilities and
mitigation techniques, provide an overview of past and current
research efforts, and to collate this research in to key areas of
activity. The aim of this paper is to identify knowledge gaps
that can subsequently be used to motivate a future a roadmap
to addressing the cyber security related challenges.
The paper is structured as follows: the following section
provides and in-depth analysis of publicly available literature
to identify cyber security related knowledge gaps. Following
this a summary table is then provided to allow the reader to
easily assess the current knowledge gaps and their significance.
The paper provides little suggestion of how these knowledge
gaps might be resolved, rather it leaves them as open questions
for the CAV community.
II. LITERATURE SURVEY
In this section, we provide a comprehensive review of
literature and categorization of the associated cyber threats.
Several factors motivated the approach taken in this research
and its subsequent organization:
1) The technology on which CAV systems are based is
still developing. This technology is yet to be subject to
significant, and often financially, motivated adversarial
pressures [8]. Rather than to inform specific practice
or policy, the primary catalysing factor for identifying
vulnerabilities is academic research [4], [3], [7], as well
as the desire to improve safety of the technology [9].
A few cases have been reported where adversaries have
exploited a relatively low-tech vulnerability [10], [5].
However, there is a lack of evidence that wide-spread
attacks are currently taking place with the intent of
maximum disruption and damage. As automation and
communication technologies become increasingly com-
mon in vehicles, an increased interest in discovering
vulnerabilities is likely as vehicular cybercrime becomes
financially motivated.
2) The nature of the supply chain means that a range
of technologies (hardware, software, and infrastructure)
are utilised without thoroughly understanding the se-
curity implications [11], [12], [13]. For example, an
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electronic chip used in one of the control units may
have a vulnerability which is not known by the control
unit manufacturer. This may result in the exposure of
vulnerabilities that are unknown to the manufacturer but
are an ‘easy win’ for an adversary.
3) In a similar manner to supply chains in the manufac-
turing sector, vehicle manufacturers outsources much
of their activity, including the design and development
of components and systems [11], [12]. For example,
the development of an electronic control unit used to
control another manufacturer’s hardware. This leads to
a situation where manufacturers are working in isolation
and are often only working to contract. It is therefore
likely that they will not add additional security measures
beyond those specified in the contract. It is also possible
that some manufacturers may not have a copy of the
source code for a control unit used in their vehicles, thus
preventing them from performing additional auditing.
The wealth of literature examined in this paper motivates
the categorisation presented in this paper. Figure 1 presents a
graphical illustration of the categorisation to aid the reader.
In Figure 1, the different infrastructures and technologies
reviewed in this paper are summarised. This includes the
Vehicle 2 Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I),
and Vehicle to X (V2X), where X is any internet-enabled
device. Furthermore, many sensor devices are illustrated, such
as Global Position Systems (GPS), Tyre Pressure Monitoring
Systems (TPMS), etc. The reader can find an explanation for
each term within this paper. It should be noted that due to
the large volumes of research in this discipline, it is likely
that some research efforts will have been missed. However,
due to the cited publication venues, it can be assumed that the
majority of significant research has been acknowledged.
A. Vehicle
In this section, a review of cyber security vulnerabilities
and mitigation efforts limited to those originating from and
affecting the physical vehicle is presented. Those resulting
from connection mechanisms and infrastructure are discussed
later.
1) Low-level Sensors: CAVs require the use of many
sensors to detect information in the surrounding environment,
categorise information according to some predetermined
or learned criteria, and make predictions about potential
vehicle activity. The type, functionality and use of a sensor
determines the extent to which it could contribute to scoping
out cyber threats, as well as the extent to which it could
inform potential implications should it be compromised.
The below subsections summarises the most common sensor
mechanisms in CAVs [14], [15], and provides information on
recent vulnerabilities and mitigation efforts.
Differential Global Positioning Systems (GPS)) provide
absolute position data with a one-meter level of accuracy.
However, this is a problematic challenge since there are many
reported difficulties with the GPS infrastructure and the way in
which the technology is affected by obstruction. These limita-
tions are often overcome with the use of an increased number
of satellites [16] to provide better coverage. In the public
domain GPS is an open standard which is freely-accessible;
however, military GPS systems use encrypted signals. The use
of GPS is popular, but due to the transparent architecture,
rogue signals can easily be generated to mislead or block the
GPS device (herein called spoofing and jamming) [17]. GPS
spoofing is quite a complex procedure and involves broadcast-
ing incorrect yet realistic and valid GPS signals to mislead
GPS receivers. For example, a spoofing attack would begin
by broadcasting signals synchronised with genuine signals
observed by the target receiver. The power of the counterfeit
signals is then increased and the position is gradually modified
away from the target. GPS devices are often programmed to
utilise the strongest signal as in an ideal world this is likely to
be more reliable. In principle this sounds relatively simple;
however, the necessary hardware requirements to generate
realistic signals make it a challenging procedure.
The generation of simplistic plug-and-play attack devices
will become reality as the potential rewards of GPS spoofing
are increased. Comprehensive theory of how to perform GPS
spoofing attacks is already in the public domain. For example,
literature has been published detailing how to perform a
successful attack [18]. Currently, however, only examples of
“proof-of-concept style attacks can be found in literature.
For example, in 2013 students from the University of Texas
demonstrated how they could generate counterfeit GPS signals
which would gradually overpower authentic GPS signals,
resulting in the deviation of a superyacht’s course. The su-
peryacht’s control then reacted to the changing GPS signals by
reporting location discrepancies to the crew who then initiated
correction by setting a new course [19]. Figure 2 illustrates that
in a GPS spoofing attack, it is only necessary for the attacker
to overpower the authentic GPS signals.
The hardware involved in the above attack was developed
by Humphreys et al., and by their own admission, is the only
GPS spoof reported in open literature which is capable of
precisely generating counterfeit GPS signals [20]. Using GPS
for criminal activity such as being able to redirect vehicles
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of high-value or those transporting goods for theft or wide-
scale disruption will be desirable. Research efforts to develop
GPS spoofing countermeasures have been taking place since
GPS was developed as open-standard technology. There are
many simple validation mechanisms that can be put in place
to prevent spoofing. For example monitoring identification
codes, satellite signals, and the use of time intervals can help
detect spoofing attempts. Warner et al. [21] detail how the
observed signal strength would be expected to be around –
163 decibel watts. A GPS simulator, such as that developed
by Humphreys et al. would provide a signal strength many
orders of magnitude larger than any possible satellite at the
Earth’s surface. In addition, GPS signals can be monitored to
ensure that their relative change is within a threshold. Warner
et al. also discuss the potential of monitoring the GPS signal
to check that its strength does vary as expected and is not too
perfect. However, if the sophistication of the attack is sufficient
to appear genuine, these validation checks will fail and the
GPS device will be spoofed. It is widely believed that nothing
short of a cryptographic, military-grade implementation will
stop spoofing [21]. This view is shared by Humphreys in the
context of CAVs [22].
The jamming of GPS is a more primitive and simplistic
attack. In comparison with spoofing, jamming only requires
that enough radio noise on the GPS frequency (1575.42
MHz) is transmitted to prevent authentic signals from being
distinguishable by the GPS receiver. Although illegal to use,
GPS jamming devices are readily available. Such devices
can be used to ensure that a vehicle’s tracking device cannot
determine its location through GPS. Executing this attack
on CAVs has the potential to disable a vehicle’s navigation
mechanism, which would be a large inconvenience for
the driver and would disable any autonomous navigation
capabilities utilising GPS. There is also the possibility of
using secondary measurement systems to aid in preventing
both spoofing and jamming attacks. However, this does rely
on the different positioning system using a different frequency
which is not also been attacked. Other measurements are in
existence which could be used as a secondary source. For
example Russian Federation’s GLONASS, China’s BeiDou,
the European Union’s Galileo, and India’s NAVIC [23].
However, as their transmission mechanisms are fundamentally
the same and just use different frequencies, the use of a
secondary satellite navigation system would only prevent
against jamming attacks if the attacker did not transmit on
the different frequencies. The use of multiple measurement
systems for spoofing attacks is much more significant as the
attacker would be required to spoof multiple systems which
inevitably increases the complexity of the attack.
Knowledge Gap 1: Although theoretical and controlled
experiments have demonstrated the potential to exploit GPS
technology to affect a vehicle’s autonomous navigation (i.e.,
see superyacht example), the potential implications of such
an attack on CAVs and the ease with which an attack may be
executed are not clear.
Inertial measurement units units are used to provide velocity,
acceleration, and orientation data using a combination of
accelerometers and gyroscopes. These sensors monitor the
dynamics of the environment and provide the vehicle with
necessary information. For example, gyroscopes and inclina-
tion sensors can determine a change in road gradient and
adjust vehicle speed accordingly to maintain safe operation.
These systems provide low-level feedback inputs to the control
system, which can initiate significant change in the vehicle’s
behaviour. There is an absence of comprehensive research and
literature on the possible exploits of these sensors; however,
it is realistic to state that intentionally compromising the
sensor to simulate false, yet realistic data will cause the
control systems to react. It can be foreseen that compromising
a primitive sensor might result in a severe compromise of
the vehicle’s functionality. For example, simulating that the
vehicle is currently on a steep gradient may force the vehicle
to travel at very low speeds and make it unusable. This would
be classed as a form of Denial of Service (DoS).
Such attacks would most likely require physical access to
the sensor to interfere with its readings, or alternatively to
intercept communication between the sensor and a control
unit. Such communication could be transmitted using a phys-
ical cable or through a close proximity wireless connection
method. Sensor readings will be validated by a control unit to
ensure that it is within tolerance and as expected. However,
providing the attacker knows the range of this tolerance, they
can ensure that the behaviour of the vehicle is adjusted without
causing the Engine Control Unit (ECU) to enter a safe mode.
An attack of this nature may have an impact beyond the
compromised vehicle. For instance, in the previous example
where an inclination sensor is compromised, the resulting slow
movement of the compromised vehicle (because the system
assumes it is on a steep gradient) will cause delay to other
vehicles using the same network.
An attack of this nature will most likely require a thorough
understanding of how the sensors are communicating with the
ECUs. However, tools such as CarShark can be used to observe
traffic on existing networks, such as a Controller Area Network
4(CAN) bus system. Research Performed by Karl Koscher et
al. demonstrated this utility on a CAN bus network using
CarShark. Their work involved performing a detailed packet
analysis and modification of packets – simulating a man-in-the
middle attack on the CAN network – and observing the effect
on the vehicle. Although this research involved testing two
modern vehicles with no autonomous functionality, they were
able to modify a sensor’s value through changing packet data.
This resulted in, for example, the ability to falsify speedometer
readings while travelling at speed [4].
Certain mitigation mechanisms can be implemented to
prevent a low-level attack. The first is through using encrypted
communication on the vehicle’s communication network.
This can ensure that counterfeit signals cannot be easily
injected onto the network. The second is through rigorous
monitoring of the signals behaviour to ensure that it is within
range and is behaving normally. The third is through the
use of additional sensors to provide a secondary source of
measurement. For example, the use of GPS and mapping data
can help determine if the vehicle is currently located on a
steep gradient.
Engine control sensors are used to acquire data to regulate
engine activity. This includes sensors such as; temperature,
air flow, exhaust gas, and engine knock and are all used
to acquire performance data which is used to adjust engine
conditions. For example, air-flow is used to adjust the amount
of fuel required by the engine to achieve the desired output.
These sensors have been used on vehicles long before the
introduction of levels of automation and connectivity between
vehicles. However, as vehicles become connected to a wider
networked infrastructure, the sensors become susceptible to
outside attacks. Furthermore, data generated by such sensors
now have influence beyond the generating vehicle. These
sensors are connected to an internal network, such as the
CAN [24], [25]. Fortunately, such sensors often require physi-
cal access to the vehicle to attack [3]. However, as connectivity
increases, care needs to be taken to ensure that these primitive
sensors are not vulnerable.
In work presented earlier (inertia measurement section),
Koscher et al. [4] demonstrated that packets distributed on an
internal network can be modified leading to change in vehicle
behaviour. This involves modifying both packets related to
Engine Management Module (EMM) inputs and outputs. As
discussed in their research, such activity can cause poor vehi-
cle performance and even physical damage. In their research,
physical access was required to the vehicle to modify packets
on the CAN network. However, research presented in this
paper demonstrates how an attacker can inject packets on to
a CAN network through remote exploits.
Koscher et al. describe the surprise and ease of generating
such unsafe operating conditions with the simple process
of modifying and introducing rogue data packets. This
raises significant concerns over the security of the critical
infrastructure. Mitigation of this vulnerability requires the
implementation of a cryptographic solution to ensure data
integrity and its authenticity. For example, recent research
presents [26] the use of an asymmetric cryptographic
using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) for ECU
authentication and stream authorisation. ECU authentication is
performed against a central security module by using stream
authentication where every message stream is authorised and
the asymmetric keys for stream access are distributed to
ECUs. This research makes it computationally infeasible to
modify or inject data packets. A challenge of implementing
a real-time cryptographic solution is the overhead of extra
computation and data transfer time. Although the researcher
do not inform of the exact incurred delay, they do report
that the “impact of our approach is small”. This research
demonstrates good potential; however, it is yet to be absorbed
and utilised in new vehicles.
Tyre-pressure Monitor Systems (TPMS) are ‘direct’ small
devices that are located on the valve of each tyre and fre-
quently update the vehicle’s control system with tyre specific
information. This sensor is small and possesses a primitive
function relative to the complexity of the entire vehicle;
however, recent attention and privacy concerns warrant its
discussion in this paper. It is of concern that a sensor with
a primitive function can have such consequences on the
vehicle and the driver. In the United States it became a legal
requirement for all vehicles to be equipped with a TPMS from
2007 [27], and 2012 in Europe [28]. Some manufacturers
have also created an algorithm-based ‘indirect’ monitoring
solution to identify a sudden change in tyre pressure. These
solutions look for a sudden change in the radius of the wheel
by monitoring the circumference, i.e., the distance covered by
one revolution of the wheel. There is debate amongst the most
reliable and suitable solution as there are many conditions that
can create false-positives, such as a rapidly wearing tyre or a
significant change in air temperature resulting in an increase
or reduction in air pressure and wheel circumference.
Direct TPMS devices operate by transmitting data to one
of the vehicle’s control units on general purpose (i.e., 315,
443 and 866 MHz) frequencies using either Frequency Shift
Keying (FSK) or Amplitude Shift Keying (ASK) to prevent
spoofing. However, Ishtiaq Rouf et al. demonstrate that the
signals can be identified and modified using packet sniffing
techniques at a range of 40m [29]. Literature also informs
that security provisions can be reverse engineered, such as the
work presented by Checkoway et al. [3], [30], who developed
specialist equipment and software to perform this attack. Rouf
et al. suggest that asymmetric encryption can be used as
a potential mitigation technique [29]. However, researchers
have identified that the use of encryption would induce the
consumption of more power [31], thus reducing battery life
and requiring the device to be replaced more frequently. The
researchers considered changing different algorithms on dif-
ferent packet sizes but this always resulted in increased power
consumption, suggesting a clear trade-off between security,
functionality, and energy efficiency.
The implications of a TPMS-based attack would result
in incorrect information being presented to the driver. This
could either be to simulate a false change in tyre pressure,
or to hide a true reduction in tyre pressure. Either way, the
core function of the TPMS is to inform the driver of a flat
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tyre. How the user reacts to this information could cause
further problems. Based on the research presented by Rouf
et al. [29], there is no reason to believe that the tyre pressure
is currently used in any vehicle decision system. However,
this is still a significant concern to public safety as drivers
in receipt of falsified messages may be caused to initiate
a dangerous reaction. Hiding a valid tyre pressure warning
message may result in the driver missing the opportunity to
bring the vehicle to a safe and controlled stop.
Knowledge Gap 2: Attacks have been reported that are
localised to a primitive and often single function sensor. Such
attacks are able to compromise a vehicle’s control systems or
display false-positive data to the driver which both result in
unexpected output. However, the full extent of which sensors
might be compromised and their effect on a vehicle’s function
is not known.
Light detection and Ranging (LiDAR) sensors are used to
generate a map of the vehicles environment for localisation,
obstacle avoidance, and navigation. LiDAR is a surveying
technology that measures distance through measuring the time
of flight of a pulse of light to determine the distance between
the sensor and an object. Figure 3 is provided as a visual
aid as well to aid the understanding of vulnerabilities with
LiDAR. This technology is capable of quickly producing 3D
maps of the environment, making it possible to develop a
computational model of the 3D environment. This can be used
for object recognition, trajectory planning ??, etc.
This technology has been shown to be a viable aid in
autonomous vehicles; however, as there is no guarantee over
the validity of the constructed 3D model, it opens the potential
for spoofing, deceiving and jamming with low cost hardware.
Work conducted by Stottelaart et al. demonstrates the potential
for jamming LiDAR by directly emitting light back at the
scanner unit which is of the same frequency as the laser
reflecting on the target [6]. A similar attack has recently been
performed by researchers from the University of Cork [32].
However, what is interesting is that in their research, not only
do they manage to compromise a LiDAR laser using low-cost
hardware (raspberry Pi and a low-power laser), but they also
manage to make the vehicle’s control unit assume that there
is a large object in front of the vehicle and force it to stop.
Furthermore, they also demonstrate the potential to overwhelm
the LiDAR sensor preventing the vehicle from moving.
Mitigation techniques exist which involve utilising different
wave lengths to try and reduce the potential for jamming
and spoofing attacks involving off-the-shelf laser devices and
increase the required hardware to perform the attack [6].
Other mechanisms discussed by Stottelaart et al. include the
use of vehicle-to-vehicle communication to collaboratively
share measurements. However, this has the potential for
a compromised measurement to be used beyond the
compromised vehicle. Another, and arguably more feasible
solution, is to implement random probing. This involves the
device frequently changing the interval between scanning
speeds to make it difficult for the attacker to synchronise
their laser to the correct frequency.
Cameras (stereo- or mono-vision) and infrared systems
are used in CAVs to provide static and dynamic obstacle
detection, object recognition, and 360 degree information
when fused with other sensors. The difference between mono-
and stereo-vision systems is the number of cameras which
are used. Mono-vision systems need additional support from
other sensors to improve accuracy in determining aspects
such as depth [33]. Stereo systems use an overlapping region
of two cameras to help determine depth. Cameras are often
fused with other sensors on CAVs. For example, the Google
Driverless Car fuses LiDAR with stereo-vision and Enhanced
Maps (Emaps) for road scenery understanding [34]. There are
many other applications of cameras in CAVs such as lane
detection [35], [36], traffic sign recognition [37], headlight
detection [38], etc. The research highlights complex image
analysis techniques to identify objects of interest. For example,
planning a path through an identified lane requires detailed
mathematical modelling, as demonstrated by Yue Wang et
al. [36]. Cameras typically contain a Charge-Coupled De-
vice (CCD) or Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor
(CMOS) sensor which can be partially disabled from a 3-
metre distance through using a low-powered laser [39], such
as a Class 2 laser found in a CD player [40]. Another potential
attack demonstrated by Stottelaart et al. can be taken against
auto exposure [6] where sensitivity and exposure is reduced
when extra light is introduced. The extra light could be from
a high powered torch or a vehicle’s headlights. This has the
potential to hide information such as traffic signs, road edges
and pedestrians.
According to an MIT Technology Review, the Google
Driver-less Car is susceptible to this problem where low
sunlight is able to blind the vehicle’s cameras [41]. The recent
tragic events of Tesla clearly illustrates the significance of
this problem where neither the car nor the driver identified a
white commercial trailer against the brightly lit sky [42]. This
raises the concern of whether shining high-powered lights at
a CAV may introduce safety concerns. Furthermore, given the
uncertainty of the environment, perhaps it is possible for a
natural event to occur which creates light conditions suitable
to disrupt camera systems.
An adversary could easily perform an attack of this nature
by directing a bright light at a vehicle. Compact, high-powered
6lights are readily available which have potential to blind a
vehicle’s cameras. It is also worth noting that an intense light
source might be accidentally reflected towards a vehicle. For
example, a vehicle or building with a particularly reflective
and concave surface might provide sufficient focussing of the
sun to disable a vehicle’s cameras. An example of this can be
found with at 20 Fenchurch St. London which was nicknamed
“walkie scorchie” and had been known to melt car paint and
parts [43]. The potential implications of an attack of this nature
are large. Disabling a vehicle’s vision system could result in
the vehicle not detecting a physical obstruction. This would
be a localised incident; however, natural conditions may cause
a wide-spread problem resulting in many localised incidents.
Different mitigation mechanisms have been discussed in
literature. For example, the introduction of more cameras,
as well as locating them at different strategic points on the
vehicle, will make it challenging for an attacker and a natural
event to affect them all. For example, the autonomous vehicle
developed by Paolo Grisleri at VisLab, Italy [44] integrates
10 cameras located in many different positions alongside the
use of 5 lasers. This increased use of sensors allows for a
more complete and reliable representation of the perceived
environment. Another potential mechanism is through the use
of camera filters to remove laser light and to prevent from
blinding. Researchers have also discussed the potential for
a camera to automatically determine when to try different
filters to improve quality [6].
Knowledge Gap 3: It has been repeatedly reported how
technologies used to sense the physical environment can be
compromised, and that mitigation techniques often involve
utilising a secondary source for redundancy. However, it is
not clear what is the best approach to take to reduce the
residual risk. For example, should multiple vision systems be
used, or should sensors utilising different technology groups
be used?
2) Vehicle Control Modules: All modern vehicles use En-
gine Control Units (ECU) to control functionality of the vehi-
cle through acquisition, processing, and control of electronic
signals. In the previous section, vulnerabilities originating
from sensors and their impact upon the system were discussed.
In this section, the potential vulnerabilities directly targeting
and affecting a vehicle’s ECUs are discussed. This is important
as CAVs involve a greater number of ECUs (compared to non-
CAVs) due to the higher volume of sensors and devices to
autonomously control and maintain connected functionality.
ECUs are loosely categorised into the following categories
(modified from [45]):
• Powertrain – the brain of the ECU. Controls more than
100 factors. Handles charging systems, transmissions,
emissions, and control with control modules.
• Safety systems - Collision avoidance, airbag deployment,
and active braking.
• Body control - electric windows, mirrors, AC, immo-
biliser, and locking.
• Data communications data communication between
different components, Bluetooth, phone, and Dedicated
Short Range Communications (DSRC).
ECUs are typically connected through the following two
mechanisms:
1) CAN buses – Controller Area Network [25] is a se-
rial communication protocol which efficiently supports
distributed real-time control. The philosophy behind
CAN is to achieve compatibility between two CAN
implementations.
2) FlexRay [46] is an automotive network communication
protocol developed to be faster and more reliable than
CAN. However, its high cost has resulted in its imple-
mentation in high-end luxury cars only (e.g., BMW X5).
In CAVs there are a number of key ECUs. The below list
(not exhaustive) provides a level of importance in descending
order [15].
1) Navigation control module (NCM)
2) Engine control module (ECM)
3) Electronic brake control module (EBCM)
4) Transmission control module (TCM)
5) Telematics module with remote commanding
6) Body control module (BCM)
7) Inflatable restraint module (IRM)
8) Vehicle vision system (VVS)
9) Remote door lock receiver
10) Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC)
11) Instrument panel module
12) Radio and entertainment centre
Due to the volume of control modules and microprocessors,
a CAV can have around 100 million lines of code across 50-
70 ECUs [47], [48]. Many researchers have quoted this fact,
including those of Carnegie Mellon University, USA [48]. As
the number of lines of code grows it becomes infeasible to
perform careful code reviews to evaluate the potential security
implications. This results in a high probability of unknown
vulnerabilities. To put this in to perspective, Microsoft’s Win-
dows 7 has around 40 million lines of code [48] and since
release there has been the discovery of many significant vul-
nerabilities. Many vulnerabilities have been identified within
the ECU types mentioned above. These vulnerabilities often
involve the attacker compromising part of the vehicle’s control
mechanism. There are many different mechanisms of compro-
mising a control unit. This might result from compromising
a vehicle’s sensor network or exploiting the control module
directly through different levels of connectivity (physical,
remote, etc.). Those attacks presented in the previous section
(Vehicle sensors) involve falsifying sensor data to cause a
desired impact on an ECU. Although there is a large overlap
between compromising a sensor and an ECU, this section will
focus on the potential impacts on the ECUs.
The navigation control module (NCM) is viewed as impor-
tant in CAVs [15] as they acquire information from a variety
of sensors that are used to detect the environment (GPS,
cameras, infrared, etc.) and then select a suitable navigation
plan. This module has a high level of control over how the
vehicle will navigate to a given location, and if compromised,
the vehicle could be commanded to drive to an unintended
location. For example, researchers from the University of
7Virginia demonstrated that a vehicle’s GPS navigation module
can be compromised and has initiated a research project to
develop inexpensive mitigation solutions [49]. Attacks of this
nature have great implications for public safety and it is
necessary to implement systems to prevent, detect and mitigate
the compromise of navigation control. For example, efforts
have been made to develop mechanisms of continuing to
navigate without satellite positioning data, for instance, due
to temporary loss [50]. Likewise, efforts have been made to
counter a Denial of Service (DoS) attack by using a self-
contained inertia measurement system. The potential implica-
tions of such an attack have already been discussed in earlier
sections. Such systems use gyroscopes and accelerometers
and are used to track position relative to a known starting
location. From a control module’s perspective, utilising an
increased array of sensors can provide mechanisms to validate
and monitor for the exploitation of other sensors.
Many features of CAVs require the complex interaction
between multiple ECUs (ECU coupling) [4]. For example,
modern vehicles have Electronic Stability Control (ESC)
systems that monitor numerous parameters, such as individ-
ual wheel speed, throttle position, steering angle, etc. The
ESC automatically modulates engine speed and wheel speed
through braking and differential control to counteract the
effect of dynamic forces on the vehicle’s stability. Coupled
systems like ESC demonstrate that compromising a single
ECU has the potential to exploit large control functionality
of the vehicle. In the case of ESC, compromising the ECU
responsible for acquiring and processing wheel speed has
the potential to impact upon the EBCM module and could
cause incorrect braking, as described by researchers at the
University of Washington [49]. In their research, CarShark
was used to modify data packets transmitted by ECUs to
compromise another ECU that caused great impact on the
vehicle’s functionality. For example, sending falsified packets
from the ECM to the EBCM regarding wheel speed can cause
the EBCM to apply the brakes. This has the potential to render
the vehicle not fit-for-purpose or cause sporadic behaviour,
which could be dangerous for the general public.
The potential severity of compromising an ECU is often
a driving force for the discovery of vulnerabilities. A recent
article published at the 2014 USA Black Hat conference by C.
Miller et al. provides a comprehensive guide of vulnerabilities
that exist in many popular vehicles in the US [51]. Researchers
from National Computing Centre (NCC), Manchester have
demonstrated that it is possible to compromise ECUs that
control core braking functionality [52] by exploiting the on-
board Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB) radio and injecting
packets onto the CAN network. This is a remote exploit
utilising the connection infrastructure (discussed later), but
it demonstrates the potential for the EBCM module to be
compromised. This could have significant implications for
public safety and necessary mitigation is required to ensure
that critical ECUs cannot be compromised. Researchers at
Yokohama National University, Japan, surveyed the use of
intrusion detection systems (based on statistical analysis),
the use of Message Authentication Codes (MAC), and
cryptographies solutions in research literature. The most
robust solution is the use of asymmetric encryption; however,
considerable development is needed to implement a robust
solution.
Knowledge Gap 4: There are many research works
demonstrating the potential to compromise ECU functionality
through inputs from sensors and other ECUs. The severity
of implication is often high as it is possible to cause the
ECU to perform dangerous operations (i.e disabling brakes,
etc). There is insufficient literature detailing comprehensive
vulnerabilities of this nature as well as suggesting reliable
mitigation techniques.
Other exploits have involved targeting control modules to
overwrite firmware to change vehicular behaviour. For exam-
ple, researchers from the University of California have demon-
strated how in some cases there are no security provisions from
stopping an attacker uploading new firmware [3]. Changing
ECU firmware has large implications as it can completely
reprogram the vehicle’s behaviour, resulting in it becoming
a potential threat to public safety. The firmware could be
modified or replaced by performing a physical and valid
update via the On-Board Diagnostics (OBD) port. In principle
this is a relatively easy procedure to perform; however, the use
of asymmetric cryptographic (public-private key) architecture
to ensure that the firmware came from a genuine source
can mitigate this vulnerability, as discussed by NXP, The
Netherlands [3].
It is inevitable that frequent updates will be required to
the large code basis in order to rectify both functional and
security flaws. The current mechanism of performing ECU
software updates through physical communication with the
control unit is predicted to be unfeasible due to the anticipated
high numbers of CAVs. Researchers have proposed the use of
remote updates through wireless technology [53], [54], [55].
Such techniques require the use of cryptography to prevent the
update mechanism becoming compromised. These systems are
recognised as providing a strong solution for distributing the
firmware updates [56]. However, the potential for firmware
updates being replaced at source with malicious code and
allowed to freely propagate through the infrastructure has
severe implications for security and safety, and could cause
significant damage.
Zhang et al. from Cisco Systems, New Jersey, USA, discuss
the potential ways in which attackers could compromise a
vehicle’s security keys to modify the ECU software, and the
significant threat posed by malware to the vehicle’s control
system [57]. They highlight many potential mechanisms to
infect malware, such as through the on-board diagnostic port,
embedded web browsers, media players and removable ports.
Once the adversary has defeated the security procedure, or
discovered a method of exploitation, these authors suggest
that the malware can be easily installed and very difficult to
identify amongst the high quantities of ECU code. Researchers
from Cisco Systems presents the use of cloud-based security
architecture for defending against malware. Although this
architecture is currently fictional, researchers believe there is
credibility in the development of such a system.
8Furthermore, it is currently the case that companies are
offering aftermarket ECU programming modifications (in
particular ECM) to increase driveability, power output, and
fuel efficiency. Such aftermarket modification is controversial
as the ECU software is proprietary and copyrighted to the
manufacturer, making it technically illegal for a third party
to make code modifications to an ECU. The caveat is that
it often voids any manufacturer’s warranty and also runs the
risk of reducing life expectancy and reliability of the vehicle.
However, this does not stop the hobbyist or car-tuning
companies from making modifications. Uploading modified
firmware by a trusted organisation also creates the potential
for malware to be installed on the ECU.
Knowledge Gap 5: Although there is a wealth of literature
out there focussing on the different components of implement-
ing a secure mechanism to remotely update vehicle software,
there is uncertainty and an absence of a consensus regarding
how proposed techniques would be implemented and what
residual risk would remain.
B. Human Aspects
Other large networks of connected and autonomous devices
(e.g., manufacturing) are facing cyber vulnerabilities of similar
significance to CAVs. Due to the number of vehicles on the
road, it is likely that the vehicle network will be the largest of
autonomous systems in existence. The number of cyber threats
resulting from or affecting users in many other domains is
often reduced as the users are already operating within, and
have specialised expertise in, a controlled environment. For
example, manufacturing machines are operated within a man-
ufacturing facility, and although being connected to external
networks, they have limited interaction with the physical world
outside of their domain. Furthermore, humans interacting with
such machines are often technologically competent and under-
stand the implications of their work. This is different in the
vehicle sector as vehicles as well as their drivers are operating
in an open environment where they may have little expertise
with the associated technology, resulting in a heightened cyber
risk. This has potential to make them easy prey for attackers as
the likelihood of them inadvertently compromising a vehicle
through an attack (e.g. phishing) is heightened.
1) Privacy: Many individuals identify themselves psycho-
logically with the vehicle by the way they drive through power
choices, control use, etc [47]. The range of different ways
in which different individuals will interact with CAVs is still
relatively undetermined, and it is unclear what data will be
generated from human integration with vehicles. Superficially,
assuming the level of automation is not adaptive, there is
a zero-sum relationship in the way humans are expected to
interact with CAVs. The greater the autonomy of the vehicle,
the less autonomy is available for the driver-changing the
role of humans from active drivers to monitors. However,
this is assuming a binary relationship between the driver
and vehicle rather than human-supervised automation [58].
Although it is not clear what personal data will be generated,
what value it will have, or what role it will play in future
(i.e., adaptive and intelligent) automation systems, it is clear
that in a connected environment all possible mechanisms must
be taken to preserve privacy.
Data such as a vehicle’s location has potential to be of
significant value. For example, determining a vehicle’s lo-
cation over a prolonged period provides the opportunity for
predetermined theft. More significantly, the vehicle’s location
is also linked to the driver’s location and is of significant
privacy concern. For example, the driver could be stalked for
theft and advertisement reasons. Determining whether the user
has just visited a cash machine and/or has been shopping in
an expensive store provides the opportunity for targeted theft.
Research undertaken at the Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Spain,
details that, in addition, vehicle sensors (video camera, etc.)
could be compromised to threaten the driver’s privacy [59].
From a non-criminal perspective, tracking a user’s location
(even anonymously) provides the potential to further track
individual behaviour [59] for tasks such as shopping. It may
be possible to determine competition and behavioural habits
which can further improve suppliers’ services. For example,
a fast food outlet would no doubt be interested in knowing
their customer’s location both before and after visiting their
premises. A hypothetical example may be determining that at
10AM on Saturday morning 80% of their customers who visit
at 11AM are at children football clubs. Such knowledge would
have significant value and it is currently unclear who would
own such data (i.e., individual vs. infrastructure provider) and
have legal rights to sell.
In order to protect individual privacy, data should be
robustly anonymised, strongly encrypted, and securely
protected to avoid being vulnerable. The exposure of personal
data would be extremely damaging for all organisations
involved, and therefore the appropriate design of CAVs
and the connected infrastructure must be taken to minimise
risks. There is a wealth of literature on implementing and
suggesting modifications to the Vehicular Ad Hoc Network
(VANETs) to ensure privacy preserving techniques are
embedded. For example, using the Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) to implement mechanisms of establishing trust and
preventing malicious data acquisition [59]. Researchers have
recently developed algorithms to implement cryptographic
authentication mechanisms to ensure that trust can be
maintained when data is broadcasted between vehicles (V2V)
and between vehicles and infrastructure (V2I). Furthermore,
through the use of encryption, their techniques are able to
demonstrate that data transmitted into the public domain is
safe if intercepted. Researchers at the Nokia Research Centre
are also addressing issues surrounding the release of location
information to make it impossible to compute the actual
vehicle location should it be intercepted [60]. This research
proposes the use of virtual trip lines to determine at what
point vehicle’s location should be broadcast. The principal
idea here is that a vehicle’s GPS location is not continually
broadcast, rather it will send an updated position once it
crosses a line segment in geographic space. There are other
vulnerabilities which have detrimental effects on the driver’s
privacy. For example, the previously discussed exploitation of
a vehicle’s tyre pressure monitoring system [29] has potential
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to invade the driver’s privacy by invoking fake warning
signals, which could cause annoyance and torment.
Knowledge Gap 6: It is largely unclear what personal
data will be generated and stored within a vehicle’s software
systems. Furthermore, it is also unclear who would own
the data, what potential risks there are, how the data can
be adequately be protected, and who is responsible for its
security.
2) Behavioural Aspects: It is widely acknowledged that
public citizens have reservations over the safety and reliability
of CAVs. This coincides with different levels of automation as
the public’s concern over reliability and safety often increases
as the automation level increases. The different levels of
automation range from level 0 where the computer offers no
assistance to level 4 where the computer does everything ig-
noring the human [58]. Figure 4 provides a grapical illustration
of each level. These reservations are often heightened through
negative events and media releases. For example, the recent
technical issue with a Tesla vehicle which resulted in the loss
of life [28]. To try to understand and improve public perception
of CAVs, researchers have performed detailed surveys and re-
search [61], [62]. These works have focussed on understanding
acceptance of the core functionality and how humans will
interact with CAVs throughout different automation levels.
However, one area that is less explored is the extent of human
involvement in cyber aspects.
For example, mechanisms can be employed to detect ma-
licious attacks. However, it is less clear how to deal with a
non-technical human operator who is being compromised by
a malicious user. This raises the following interesting, and
largely unanswered questions:
1) Can the vehicle enter a safe mode to ensure operator’s
safety?
2) How human users should be informed of the situation,
and how much control should the operator be given?
I.e. what level of automation should be enforced during
a detected cyber-attack.
3) Are there mechanisms that can collect sensory and
other diagnostic information integrated into a single
decision-making process in order to flag a suspicious
or potentially harmful situation?
The vehicle’s control systems may be able to detect po-
tentially damaging system activity by monitoring on the sig-
nal level. Like many other safety-critical systems, vehicles
implement runtime monitoring techniques to ensure that in-
ternal variables – used to represent sensor data and control
parameters – are not allowed to go beyond some predefined
safe working range. The use of safety limits in safety-critical
ECUs has recently been discussed [63]; however, such safety
limits work well in the management of engine functionality,
but imposing them on sensors working in a vastly changing
dynamic environment can be challenging.
Furthermore, variables often need to be monitored in con-
junction because their relationship can often be used as a
secondary source of validation. For example, both GPS and
wheel speed sensors can be used to determine speed. GPS
will be less accurate due to positioning limitations, but it
is sufficient to determine if the wheel speed sensors are
reliable. The procedure for when a variable goes out-of-range
is to enter some kind of safe mode where vehicle speed is
significantly reduced, allowing the driver to bring the vehicle
to a controlled stop. These techniques work well; however, due
to the increased connectivity and presence of cyber threats, it
is not clear whether checking mechanisms are sufficient or if
they can be easily bypassed.
In 2015, Chris Urmson, the director of the Google Self-
Driving Cars project stated that if “software detected an
anomaly somewhere in the system that could have possible
safety implications; in these cases it immediately handed
control of the vehicle to our test driver” [64]. He added that
of 69 incidents detected, there would have been no way of
knowing the seriousness of incidents if no intervention had
been taken. These incidents included those in which a vehicle
was unable to plan a safe sequence of moves to navigate
in tight spaces. However, there was no evidence that any
of these incidents were related to cyber-attacks. This is an
area that is relatively unexplored and there is an absence
of literature informing on how vehicle safety measures can
intervene and prevent cyber-attacks. Due to the volume of
literature on attacking and compromising vehicles, it would
appear that there is an absence of any cyber-specific control
mechanisms and safe-mode.
In the case of the Google driverless car, the test drivers
are all educated to a sufficient standard of the technology
and what to do should control be handed back to the driver.
However, this might be challenging for drivers with lower
technical ability and ignores the safety implications associated
with mode errors (I.e., not knowing or not being able to
infer the status of the system when control is handed back
to the human after a period of automation) that typify this
situation [65]. Furthermore, if a cyber-attack was detected and
it was established that control should be given to the driver, it
would be important for the vehicle to inform the driver of the
current situation in a suitable way to mitigate any potential
mode error and allow the user to make informed, timely, and
safe decisions.
Knowledge Gap 7: There is a lack of research detailing
how the vehicle or driver may react to detecting a potential
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cyber attack. Will the vehicle have a safe mode which the
vehicle can enter to ensure that a safe level of control can be
maintained? Furthermore, if the vehicle was to detect that it
had been compromised, how would it pass control back to the
driver with enough information for the driver to quickly make
sense of the situation?
C. Connection Infrastructure
In order for vehicles to communicate with the driver,
other cars, and the road, they need to utilise many different
communication technologies. Three broad classifications of
communication mechanisms exist in the literature. These are
vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I), and
the “Cloud”.
V2V communication provides the mechanism for vehicles
to communicate with each other in a peer-to-peer mechanism,
I.e., no client/server architecture is required. The system uses
the unlicensed 5.9GHz band range, known as the IEEE 802.11.
This wireless range frequency spectrum has been allocated a
harmonised basis in Europe and the United States, although the
systems are not yet compatible. The principle is that when two
vehicles or ITS stations are in radio communication range, they
can connect automatically and establish an ad hoc network
where all connected stations can share information such as
position, speed, direction, etc.
V2I communication mechanisms provide a means for vehi-
cles to connect to the electronic devices controlling and moni-
toring the physical environment within which the vehicles are
travelling [66]. The infrastructure can then use this information
to optimise the traffic control infrastructure to maximise traffic
flow, minimizing fuel usage and pollution. A V2I is often
described as a centralised control infrastructure, whereas a
V2V is decentralised. Example uses of V2I include the control
of vehicle acceleration and velocity to optimise travel times,
fuel consumption, and congestion levels.
1) Attack Types: Coupling CAVs with an array of
different communication mechanisms will inevitably result
in them being accessible through a publicly accessible
infrastructure (i.e. the internet), or broadcast into public
space. This opens the potential for CAVs to experience
large-scale, automated and highly damaging attacks. There is
great potential for attacks that are damaging to the current
information technology to be carried over to CAVs. The
list below looks at some of the prominent categories of IT
attack types and identifies any relevant literature detailing
attacks of this type in CAVs and what mitigation was required.
Password and key attacks are where security restriction
mechanisms are continuously tested using different values
to see if they can be compromised. Attacks of this nature
can generally be classified into the three different categories
of a 1) dictionary attack, 2) rainbow table attack, and 3)
brute force attack. A dictionary-based attack will use a list
of words, which are used individually and in combination,
to repeatedly attempt to crack the password. A rainbow
table attack is similar in nature; however, it uses a list
of pre-computed hashes, constructed from all the possible
passwords and a given algorithm. This reduces the time
required to crack a password to the time taken to identify the
correct hash in the table. A brute force attack is similar to
that of a dictionary attack; however, it is also able to identify
non-dictionary words by working through all alpha-numeric
combinations. This can be a slow process due to the large
potential combinations, but it is a complete process meaning
that the correct password will eventually be identified. Brute
force attacks have been used for compromising VANETs.
Research work has discussed the potential of how a brute
force attack could be performed to crack the cryptographic
keys in VANETs; however, it should be noted that no
formal analysis of the complexity of this attack is provided.
Therefore, it can only be established that attacks of this
nature are possible, but have not yet been performed [67],
[68]. Michael Jenkins and Syed Masud Mahmud provide
research detailing the ease of which Bluetooth can easily be
brute-forced as it usually has a 4-digit pin. In their research
they describe how a Pentium IV 3 GHz processor is able to
crack the correct pin in 0.06 seconds [69]. An example of a
Rainbow table attack is that performed by Flavio Garcia from
the University of Birmingham to crack the 96-bit Megamos
Crypto algorithm used by many vehicle manufacturers.
Building the 1.5 Terabyte rainbow table took less than one
week, but exhaustive search only takes seconds [70]. This has
potential implications for vehicle owners as it demonstrates
that security mechanisms can easily be compromised and the
vehicle can easily be stolen. Although this attack is quite
complex to perform in that specialist hardware and software
is required, there is significant potential for off-the-shelf
solutions to become available as attacks of this type will
become financially motivated. Attacks of this type can be
prevented by implementing stronger mechanisms (i.e. larger
keys, more secure algorithms); however there will always
be an underlying risk that cannot be eliminated. It is also
possible that as technology progresses, and computational
power increases, current encryption mechanisms that are
deemed secure may become easy to crack.
Knowledge Gap 8: Mitigation techniques often involve the
use of cryptographic techniques. However, due to the long
expected life of a vehicle, and the continuing progression
of computing power, it is not clear whether the proposed
techniques and the vehicle infrastructure will provide a
sufficient level of security throughout the vehicle’s lifespan.
Denial of Service (DoS)/Distributed Denial of service
(DDoS) attacks are where the normal service of a system is
disrupted either by a single or multiple attacking machines.
Researchers have demonstrated how DDoS attacks can be
performed against VANETs [71] and that it is possible
to identify malicious connections for prevention [72],
[73]. Different types of DoS attacks can be performed by
overwhelming 1) a single network node, 2) vehicle to vehicle
(V2V), or 3) vehicle to infrastructure (V2I) [74]. All these
attacks are damaging and aim to disrupt the infrastructure.
However, V2I DoS attacks are likely to cause widespread
disruption to communication mechanisms. Attacks of this
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type prevent important communication between vehicles
and will ultimately disrupt traffic flow. More significantly,
attacks of this type may cause vehicle collisions as potential
warning mechanisms may never reach the intended recipient.
Furthermore, as with most countermeasures, they can
inevitably be broken given enough time and persistence. The
implications of compromising VANETs are significant as they
are used for functionality such as communicated braking,
platooning, traffic information systems, as well as the local
infrastructure.
Network protocol attacks are where communication
protocols are analysed to identify potential exploitation
mechanisms. Once identified, an attack can then be
mounted against the acquired knowledge. Researchers have
demonstrated that attacks can be mounted and detected
against the FlexRay, and CAN protocols [75]. Due to a lack
of confidentiality protection, an attacker can read all data sent
on the FlexRay bus, as well as send spoofed packets, which
can modify vehicular behaviour [76]. It is clear that protocols
are carefully analysed by the scientific community to identify
exploits, and once identified, suitable mitigation action will
be taken. However, such a reactive approach is not feasible
as the number of CAVs on the road increases.
Phishing is a form of social engineering where a user
masquerades as a trusted entity to gain sensitive information
or compromise the system. Phishing attacks are currently
the most common form of attacks on PC-based architectures
and are often performed through unsolicited email. There is
currently an absence of literature detailing significant phishing
attacks in CAVs; however, should a user’s device that is
connected to a CAV be compromised through phishing, the
adversary will be able to mount attacks on the vehicle through
the connected network via the device. Attacks of this nature
are likely to become more wide-spread as the integration
between the vehicle and user applications is tightened [77],
e.g., as in the recent integration of email systems and the
vehicle’s entertainment and information system. There are
many damaging potential impacts that could happen as a
result of a phishing attack, but as detailed in marketing
material from FireEye, it is anticipated that ransomware
attacks would soon be developed to seize control of the
vehicle and render it unusable until the user pays a premium
for it to be unlocked [78]. Phishing and ransomware attacks
have the potential to be very damaging for the user as the
system may become unusable, which can have considerable
financial consequences. As the technology of CAVs is
currently developing, it is not clear how these attacks may
take place and how they may be prevented. However, as this
is a financially motivated crime, it is clear that vulnerabilities
will be exploited if they are discovered.
Knowledge Gap 9: The level of connectivity and
automation in vehicles is continuously expanding, and hence
the dependence on technology integration in the vehicle
is increasing. Common examples include vehicles with
embedded web browsing, email functionality, and bluetooth
connectivity. Although the literature describes the nature of
current phishing and ransomware attacks, there is a lack of
literature detailing how attacks of this type may occur, and
what can be done to mitigate them.
Rogue updates are where software running on a vehicle’s
ECUs is updated with software which was not produced
by the manufacturer and has hidden vulnerabilities. Many
researchers have discussed the requirements for a distribution
model where manufacturers can update the firmware on
large numbers of vehicles without a large financial overhead.
The research community are in agreement that Firmware
updates Over The Air (FOTA) is a credible solution.
However, they are also in agreement that there are large
potential security implications. Furthermore, secure protocols
need to be developed that use cryptographic techniques to
guarantee with a certain level of confidence that the update is
legitimate [54], [79]. These solutions can provide convincing
architectures; however, without wide-scale testing there will
always be uncertainty over their security.
Knowledge Gap 10: There is a lack of literature detailing
how a manufacturer would respond to cyber incidents. Some
manufacturers, such as Fiat-Chrysler, have implemented
mechanisms that enable vulnerabilities to be reported. There
is no literature detailing how a manufacturer would respond
to a significant and wide-spread attack. It is essential to have
a robust incident response plan as incorrect management
could have huge financial and reputation implications.
The remainder of this section surveys literature to identify
current and likely vulnerabilities and mitigation efforts result-
ing from the connectivity of vehicles. These are: 1) physical
access, 2) close proximity, and 3) remote access.
2) Physical Access: Vulnerabilities arising from exploiting
a vehicle’s control mechanisms through physical access have
been around since the integration of sophisticated ECUs.
However, with the increasing use of sensors and control
modules in CAVs, the potential implications of compromising
a system’s sensory, control, and communication mechanisms
are heightened.
Physical attacks are often categorised as either ‘direct’
or ‘indirect’ attacks. Direct attacks involve targeting specific
aspects of the vehicle’s electronic control systems through
physically accessing the system, whereas indirect attacks in-
volve exploiting or overloading aspects of the system to cause
indirect damage. For example, an example of a direct attack is
“bus tapping” (I.e., gaining unauthorised access to the under-
lying network) the CAN protocol and reprogramming ECUs.
A recent exposure of a direct vulnerability was the realisation
that BMW vehicles can have new keys reprogrammed through
on-board diagnostic (OBD) port exploitation [80]. This is a
relatively low-cost attack that requires plugging a device into
the OBD port to bypass the vehicle’s immobilising systems
and programme a new key to start the vehicle. As detailed
by Clifford UK, prior to this attack, the attacker needs to
gain access to the vehicle; however, this is achieved through
cracking the 48-bit Hittag system, which is reported to take 3
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minutes using standard computer hardware [80].
Physical access vulnerabilities have been evolving since
the production of the first motor vehicle and they are not
solely a direct consequence of CAVs. However, the number of
potential attacks and their significant has evolved considerably
with the introduction of more sophisticated electronic sensors
and control modules in CAVs. The following sections detail
some of the prominent physical access vulnerabilities and
mitigation technologies.
On-board Diagnostic (OBD) port. The OBD can access
the network infrastructure within the vehicle (I.e., all CAN
busses). This is an intended level of access as the OBD port
is a means of maintenance and upgrading ECU firmware. The
OBD port does have a reduced threat level when compared
to wireless connection mechanisms as it is located physically
within the car; however, once access has been acquired, it
is possible to perform significant modification to the ECU’s
functionality [4]. Examples could include modifying the code-
bases responsible for engine, lighting, and braking functional-
ity. In addition, it has also been identified that criminal organ-
isations may aim to extract the intellectual property of OEMs,
as well as stealing driver sensitive data [5]. The mechanisms
of access control within the OBD protocol are relatively weak
but allow the attacker to easily extract and modify firmware
and parameters, for example, by reducing the mileage count
to increase a vehicle’s value. This has implications for a
potential buyer as they may be sold something which is not
genuine. It is also possible that individuals may want to falsify
log information on the ECU to hide their involvement in a
vehicle accident, or even to commit insurance fraud. Research
has demonstrated the possibility of performing a forensic
investigation of a vehicle’s ECUs through the OBD port is
presented [53]. Although this research is in its infancy, it raises
the need for manufacturers to consider forensic implications of
their devices. Previous research has demonstrated the potential
of using cryptographic techniques for message authentication
of the CAN network, and has considered backwards compati-
bility, as a means to mitigate the transfer of unauthorised data
on the CAN network. Although the problem of access control
mechanisms has been acknowledged and consideration given
to how it might be improved (e.g., Escrypt), a solution has yet
to be offered. This area of research is largely unaddressed.
Knowledge Gap 11: If an accident was to occur involving
CAVs, or if one was to be involved in financially motivated
crime (e.g., clocking, theft, etc.), then it would be necessary
to forensically analyse the on-board systems to determine,
beyond reasonable doubt, what happened. The literature
detailing how software-based systems might be designed with
forensic investigations in-mind is virtually non-existent. It is
possible to perform forensic investigations to provide a solid
legal basis to prosecute criminals participating in criminal
activity involve CAVs.
Media systems. The functionality of a vehicle’s media systems
is to receive a variety of wireless broadcast signals (AM,
FM, etc.), decode them, and play the represented media to
the user. A media player will often accept standard compact
discs and support decoding many audio formats (MP3, WMA,
etc.) on an ISO 9660 file system. In addition, many modern
media systems can also play audio from alternative storage
mechanisms such as a USB-mounted file system. The media
system can also be linked to the CAN network, which has
previously resulted in the identification of potential vulnera-
bilities. For instance, it is possible to inject packets onto the
CAN bus network through exploiting a vulnerability of the
media player [3]. In this vulnerability, it has been identified
that packets can be encoded in WMA audio files. WMA
audio files allow embedding pictures and other text-based
information which is processed by the media player. In this
particular case, it was possible to include executable code
which could release CAN packets onto the network. Interest-
ingly, it has also been identified that such executables would
have no adverse effects on other media players, even though
included in PCs. Researchers also allude to the possibility
of a compromised media file being shared through peer-to-
peer networks with the attack going unnoticed. This has large
implications for the vehicle and the driver as the attack could
cause a significant change in vehicle behaviour. It is also
worrying that an attack of this nature could potentially rapidly
spread by masquerading in a seemingly benign file. Mitigation
of vulnerabilities of this type can be performed at both the
application (media system) and infrastructure level (CAN
protocol). Mitigating such vulnerability in a media system
would require patching the system, as well as designing and
developing such technology with an increased consideration
for cyber security requirements. Mitigation at the CAN level
will require robust mechanisms of ensuring authenticity of data
packets, as discussed in Section II-A.
3) Close Proximity Vulnerabilities: Close proximity
vulnerabilities are those exposed through short-range
communication mechanisms. This could involve the
exploitation of on-board sensors to attack the system or
the network communication mechanism. Such attacks may
be primitive and may even happen by coincidence. For
example, a situation may arise where a person inadvertently
does something in the vehicle’s perceived environment (e.g.
walking down the pavement with a big box), which causes the
system to take reactive measures. On the contrary, attacks may
be more sinister and pre-planned to intentionally compromise
the system. For instance, a malicious user could just keep
sending the vehicle false signals to disorient, hijack, or even
restrict it to within a virtual fence, as presented by researchers
at the Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Massachusetts [81].
Bluetooth. Many modern cars have built in Bluetooth
capabilities for media connectivity purposes. Researchers
have identified that the Bluetooth control code contains
a potential memory exploit, allowing the execution of
code from any paired Bluetooth device [82]. It is possible
that a compromised device which is paired to the vehicle
could start to attack the vehicle’s ECUs without the
driver knowing. Researchers have developed and tested a
security layer for smartphone-to-vehicle communication over
Bluetooth. Previous research discusses the vulnerabilities
with Bluetooth-enabled systems, and not just those within the
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vehicle domain [83]. Dardenelli’s research provides a detailed
and lengthy investigation into the vulnerabilities, and it is
surprising just how vulnerable Bluetooth-enabled devices are.
Furthermore, it is also surprising that although researchers
have developed many secure Bluetooth protocols utilising
cryptographic techniques, many commercial solutions do
not implement such security mechanisms as they can have
adverse effects on usability. Furthermore, those techniques
that do use cryptography to establish trust do not do anything
to prevent the execution of malicious code through memory
exploitation. However, it will prevent the attack of using
open source tools, such as Bluesniff, for analysing packets
distributed in the public domain [84].
Knowledge Gap 12: Manufacturers are utilising
technology (hardware and software) that has inherent
security vulnerabilities. This is largely due to a functionality
focus in supply chain manufacturing where parts are produced
to a functional contract and, due to tight time constraints, no
additional effort is taken to ensure rigorous security.
Keyless entry and ignition systems. It is widely accepted
that in primitive systems, remote central locking signals
can be captured and replicated to gain access to a vehicle,
and more importantly, disable the alarm and immobiliser
allowing thieves sufficient time to start and steal the vehicle.
Manufacturers have invested heavily in implementing systems
that are much harder to circumvent. These often involve using
some kind of cryptographic key change protocol. However,
vulnerabilities are still being identified allowing adversaries
to gain access to luxury vehicles. A news article by The
Guardian details that luxury Range Rovers with keyless
locking systems are being targeted by thieves. Furthermore,
the requirement for new keys to be programmed to a vehicle
presents the opportunity to programme a new key and drive
the vehicle away. This is something that is being exploited
in premium Audi RS4 vehicles [90] (see driving.com) where
thieves are able to add a new key into the system once
they gain physical access to the vehicle. Although this
is a premeditated sophisticated attack to exploit a known
vulnerability, Audi have dismissed any liability. Researchers
from the University of Birmingham [70] developed techniques
of cracking encryption mechanisms used for keyless entry;
however were initially prevented from publishing their
research by UK government over fears of enabling criminals
with knowledge to easily steal luxury vehicles.
Signal jamming for connected devices. As previously dis-
cussed in Section II-A1, any sensor that is remotely connected
to a vehicle using a form of wireless connectivity can be
exploited through a signal jamming attack. Signal jamming
attacks aim to deliberately block, jam or interfere with au-
thorised communication. The attacks often work by reducing
the signal-to-noise ratio making it challenging to differentiate
the desired signals from background noise. Signal jamming is
relatively easy to perform and the required signal broadcasting
equipment is readily available at low cost. In addition to
research detailed earlier in this report, researchers have also
demonstrated the potential for wireless inter-vehicle commu-
nication to be interrupted through signal jamming, resulting
in a DoS attack [85]. In the work undertaken at Pennsylvania
State University, researchers demonstrated how the Wireless
access in vehicular environments (WAVE) standards (IEEE
1609) can be jammed such that nodes within the network
(e.g., vehicles) are no longer able to receive communication.
The WAVE standard is an extension of the IEEE 802.11
standard to accommodate communication between vehicles
and roadside infrastructure. Their research presents three types
of jamming. The first is trivial jamming where an attacker
constantly transmits noise, the second is a periodic attack
where noise is broadcast for random durations and at random
intervals, and the third is a reactive attack where signals are
only broadcast when communication signals are detected. A
jamming attack on this communication technology has consid-
erable safety implications as vehicles may become unaware of
important information coming from both other vehicles and the
infrastructure. The required knowledge and hardware depends
on the connection mechanism that the attacker wants to jam.
Attacks are also possible on other close proximity networks.
For example, the tyre pressure monitoring system (TPMS) uses
a 315 MHz or 433 MHz band wireless infrastructure [29]. It
has been demonstrated that this network can be exploited by
signal jamming and falsification of data [29]. The potential
implications of jamming the TPMS are that false tyre pressure
warning messages can be generated, which may not only
annoy or distract the user but also supress genuine warnings
or alerts (e.g., tyre is rapidly deflating) resulting in potential
safety concerns should a driver not be able to detect the true
status of the system or bring the vehicle to a safe stop.
Signal jamming attacks are often difficult to overcome, but
technology and research can be adapted from the military
domain. One mechanism to prevent jamming attacks is
to develop solutions that still allow the intended signal to
be detected in environments with large volumes of noise.
This area of research has received significant interest in the
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) research community. This is
not surprising as radio communication is of critical importance
for the safe use of a UAV. Scientists at the Beihang University,
China, carried out a survey of anti-jamming techniques for
UAVs [86] and found that current methods are mainly based
on different signal processing, filtering, and identification
techniques to help identify the signal amongst large volumes
of noise. There may be value in translating this research
to CAVs since it is sometimes not feasible (due to safety
requirements) to rely on one method of communication given
the ramifications of potential failure. For example, in the
military domain, especially in weapon guidance systems,
multiple systems are fused together to improve reliability.
To prevent GPS jamming and spoofing attacks, other types
of sensors have been integrated to maintain safe and reliable
navigation mechanisms. For instance, an Inertia Measurement
System (IMS) was integrated with a GPS system [87]
(Naval Surface Warfare Center, USA) to provide navigation
mechanisms even when GPS systems are compromised for
short periods.
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Knowledge Gap 13: Denial of service attacks are always
going to be possible, especially when considering radio-based
connection mechanisms. It is currently unclear how CAVs
will be able to detect such attacks to prevent any adverse
action from autonomously being performed.
4) Remote Access Vulnerabilities: As CAVs become in-
creasingly connected via different network mechanisms (E.g.
Wi-Fi, 3G, GPRS), it is becoming possible to compromise
devices – such as the embedded microprocessors connected
via a CAN bus – that were not originally intended to be
linked to outward-facing networks through remote exploit
mechanisms. On the contrary, the connection of CAN-enabled
devices can allow for mechanisms that can automatically
call for emergency assistance during severe collisions, and
pass-on information acquired through vehicle sensors to help
emergency services respond more appropriately. For example,
passing on information from accelerometers, velocity, and
speed sensors can help determine the potential forces involved.
In addition, sensory information such as whether an airbag has
been deployed can also be used to determine where the forces
originated.
Although this connectivity provides much desired function-
ality, it increases the probability of being remotely attacked.
This possibility is becoming increasingly likely as the CAV’s
infrastructure utilises the internet architecture. The remainder
of this section discusses some of the vulnerabilities originating
from prominent network connection mechanisms, as well as
those attacks which will becoming increasingly likely and have
great implications on the security of CAVs.
First, it is useful to discuss the differences between broad-
cast and addressable channels. Broadcast channels are those
that are not specifically directed towards a given vehicle.
Rather, they can be received on-demand. Radio transmission,
like GPS, is an example of a broadcast channel. The signal is
not targeted towards an individual vehicle but perpetrators can
tune in to them. Long-range broadcast channels are appealing
as a potential attack surface as they are difficult to monitor and
control. Furthermore, they can be received by many receivers
simultaneously without the need to address a singular vehicle
as in other communication mechanisms (E.g., the TCP/IP
protocol can be used to address an individual vehicle). An
addressable channel of communication is one where part of
the vehicle’s computerised systems is communicated through
being specifically addressed on a network. For example,
communicating via Transmission Control Protocol / Internet
Protocol (TCP/IP), which requires a known IP address to direct
communication. Addressable channels are also advantageous
for the attacker as they often communicate over wide-scale
data networks (e.g., 3G) and enable exploits to be performed
from different geographical locations and jurisdiction.
The below section details the more prominent connection
mechanisms for remote-access and provides information into
the exploits originating from the different technology used
for remote connection mechanisms.
Radio. Communication mechanisms which fall under the
umbrella term of radio are those long-range signals which
are used by GPS systems, Digital Radio, Radio Data System
(RDS), and Traffic Message Channels. The range of signals
depends on transmitter power, terrain, and interference [3].
For example, a 5W RDS transmitter can be expected to
deliver 1.2kbps over distances up to 10km. The majority of
vehicles currently on the road will also have a built-in media
player which is capable of receiving mechanisms of radio
communication. Furthermore, it is also likely that many of
these vehicles will connect to the vehicle’s CAN bus. A
recent report details that security professionals from NCC,
UK have demonstrated that control of vehicles’ brakes and
other critical systems can be acquired by sending data via
Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB) signals [52]. This attack
exploited the fact that many modern entertainment systems
process DAB data to display text and pictures on a dashboard
screen. Worryingly, it has been highlighted that this attack
could be performed using low-cost, off-the-shelf hardware
and can be performed on many vehicles at once through
a broadcast mechanism. Although the attacker would need
to have a detailed understanding of how to construct and
transmit DAB data that can exploit a vulnerability, there
is the potential for such attacks to be easily compiled into
an executable file suitable for an attacker with very limited
knowledge.
Cellular and Internet-enabled exploits The cellular
(synonymous with mobile) network architecture is used by
vehicles as a mechanism for long-range communication.
There are many different technologies that use a cellular
network infrastructure. In CAVs, connection mechanisms
which have a high bitrate are most desirable for performing
tasks such as continuous streaming of data. For example, a
survey publication discusses the use of 3G as mechanism
in inter-vehicle communication [88]. However, in principle,
a CAV can be developed to utilise any cellular-based
architecture. Addressable cellular data networks are used in
CAVs to distribute data such as crash reporting, diagnostics,
anti-theft, and convenience (e.g., weather and traffic updates).
Cellular enables attackers to conduct remote attacks on a
vehicle as it can be performed over a long distance in a
largely anonymous fashion [3], [89]. There is an absence
of literature detailing attacks that specifically target cellular
infrastructure with most of the literature focussing on those
targeting to exploit internet-enabled technology regardless of
whether it is connected using a cellular network or connected
through a WiFi hotspot.
Knowledge Gap 14: Vulnerabilities are currently identified
by white-hat hackers performing research-based penetration
testing. However, as CAVs become increasingly connected and
common on roads, it is likely that automated attacks will be
developed and executed by those without expert knowledge. It
is currently unclear how these might be performed and how
both infrastructure and vehicle will react.
The remote connection exploits mentioned thus far would
be possible through using an internet-based connection and
this creates the potential for wide-scale and automated attacks.
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For example, it is likely that attacks will be programmed
into a script which can be executed by any attacker with
no specialised expertise. Enabling attacks on a large scale
raises concerns of the need for strong security mechanisms
embedded in CAVs to protect against both known and un-
known vulnerabilities. Known vulnerabilities are those which
will be common knowledge in the public domain, and will
most likely appear in the automated scripts. Unknown attacks
are those which have not yet been identified, but may be
detectable through closely monitoring CAVs. Another aspect
of CAVs that has surfaced in academic literature is how the on-
board computer systems and network connection mechanisms
can be forensically audited. Previous work has discussed how
forensic investigations can be conducted to establish gateway
activity [53].
Internet-enabled communication has resulted in car man-
ufacturers developing solutions where a vehicle can be in-
teracted with remotely through application- and web-based
communication. However, functionality of this nature is likely
to attract the attention of security practitioners. For example,
Nissan released an iOS and Android application allowing a
driver to remotely interact with their vehicle (e.g., to configure
heating controls, etc.). Nissan used the Vehicle Identification
Number (VIN) - a unique vehicle ID - to handle the mapping
between the driver’s application and vehicle without any
password based authentication. This was a huge oversight by
Nissan as VIN numbers are normally located on the bottom
corner of the dashboard and visible from outside. Furthermore,
VIN numbers are often allocated in batches meaning that
adversaries could simply change the last number and it would
be very likely that they would connect to another Nissan Note,
regardless of its geographic location [10].
III. SUMMARY OF FUTURE CHALLENGES
Table III provides a summary of the knowledge gaps identi-
fied in this research survey, as well as highlighting some of the
potential impacts that may occur if this knowledge gap was not
adequately addressed. Although the identified knowledge gaps
are speculative and based on the current research activity, it
should be noted that it is not an exhaustive list and some gaps
may have been missed. It is also likely that as both research
and release of CAVs continues, many new gaps will also be
identified that will need to be acknowledged.
The primary aim of this paper was to identify knowledge
gaps, but it is particularly noteworthy to state that the identified
gaps are sizeable and will most likely require significant
research effort to provide holistic solutions. Both research
and commercial attention to the cyber security implications of
CAVs are becoming increasingly acknowledged and industry is
slowly adapting. However, it is crucial that the identified gaps
are addressed before more vehicles with increasing levels of
connectivity and automation are on the market.
IV. CONCLUSION
This review was performed through a logical analysis and
exploration of literature available in the public domain. The
literature has highlighted that there are many focussed areas of
research which are identifying potential vulnerabilities as well
as proposing potential mitigation techniques. A substantial
portion of the identified research details reactive action to
the detection of a cyber security vulnerability. There are
also publications discussing the potential for a security- and
human-centric design process to minimise the likelihood of a
vulnerability occurring. However, as far as literature details,
such processes are still in their infancy and are not widely
adopted.
There are many sizeable gaps in knowledge which require
attention from CAV research communities and automotive
manufacturers. It is essential that these knowledge gaps are
adequately addressed as soon as possible to prevent the need
for large-scale reactive action, as well as to standardise the
industry and ensure a high-degree of cyber security is main-
tained across vehicle manufacturers, the travel infrastructure,
and the end-users.
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Knowledge Gap Potential Impact
Unknown implications of exploiting navigation mechanisms • Gaining remote control over a vehicle’s autonomous functionality
• Targeted hijacking of valuable vehicles
• Large safety concerns for public citizens
Unknown potential to exploit primitive low-level sensors • Unexpected or unforeseen inputs may result in unpredicted vehicle
behaviour
• Increases potential for modifying vehicle performance
How many sensors are required to provide sufficient redundancy • Insufficient use of sensors may allow a cyber attack to create ‘blind
spots’ with large potential consequences
• Overuse of sensor devices would inflate manufacturing cost, but may
increase end-user confidence
A comprehensive analysis of how and to what effect ECUs can be
compromised • Compromising ECU functionality could significantly change vehicle
functionality
• Presents danger to citizens as the vehicle could conduct unsafe
operations
How ECU software will be updated on a wide-scale whilst maintaining
security
• No mechanism to update on a wide-scale will result in many
vulnerable systems
• Insecure system might be susceptible to rogue updates
What personal data will be generated and stored on a vehicle, and to
what extent it can be exploited
• Large volumes of personal data might be generated without the
passengers’ knowledge
• Breaches of privacy might occur should the data be illicitly acquired
• Monetisation of CAVs would increase data theft
How will control be passed back to the vehicle if it detects a cyber
threat and how will it pass control back to the driver
• Driver might be unable to make sense of the situation and make
incorrect decisions
• Dangerous to passengers and other vehicles
How the use of cryptographic techniques will withstand the potential
increase in computational power
• Infrastructure and vehicles could be vulnerable should any security
mechanisms become vulnerable and not fit-for-purpose through the
vehicle’s anticipated life expectancy
The potential for user targeted attacks (phishing, ransomware) to occur • User is targeted to increase attack success
• Potential for financial damage if the user has to pay for their vehicle
to be cleaned of any malware
How would a manufacturer respond to a large scale cyber attack • The manufacturer might be unable to respond to a cyber attack and
the vehicle owners might be left vulnerable
How the added computational resources of a CAV can be utilised in
digital forensics
• Inability to prove attacks/theft could impact on the ability to prose-
cute criminals
• Ability to modify historical information (e.g mileometer) would
result in a lack of public trust
How manufacturers can adopt a culture of cyber security accountability
in the supply chain
• Vulnerabilities will always exist if manufacturers do not operate
under a security-centric philosophy
How CAVs can detect and prevent adverse autonomous activity due
to Denial of Service attacks
• Simplistic attacks on infrastructure may result in unusable vehicle
features
• Disabling essential V2V and V2I communication mechanisms could
impact upon navigation and collision avoidance systems
Potential implications of large-scale automated attacks which can be
executed without expert knowledge
• Automated attacks will allow for vulnerable vehicles to be easily
identified
• Lack of expert knowledge required will allow non-expert users to
execute attacks and potentially cause significant damage
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF GAPS IN KNOWLEDGE AND THEIR POTENTIAL IMPACT
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